Experimental Evidence on Tax Salience and Tax Incidence by Morone, Andrea et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Experimental Evidence on Tax Salience
and Tax Incidence
Andrea Morone and Francesco Nemore and Simone Nuzzo
6 October 2016
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/74319/
MPRA Paper No. 74319, posted 6 October 2016 17:40 UTC
1 
 
 
Experimental Evidence on Tax Salience and Tax Incidence 
 
Andrea Morone
1
, Francesco Nemore
2
 and Simone Nuzzo
2 
Abstract 
While a basic theoretical principle in public economics assumes that individuals’ behaviour is fully-
optimizer with respect to the introduction of a tax, an increasing body of research is presenting evidence 
that agents decision making is often affected by non-negligible cognitive biases, which could be 
responsible for lower market performance as well as for deviations from standard theoretical predictions. 
This paper extends the latter strand of research focusing on two trend topics in public economics: tax 
salience and tax incidence. While the former refers to the prominence of the tax, the latter places 
emphasis on the statutory vs. factual division of tax payments. Is market performance affected by the 
salience of the tax? Is the incidence of a tax independent of which side of the market it is levied on  
(Liability Side Equivalence Principle, LES)? We address these questions through a laboratory experiment 
in which one unit of a fictitious good is traded through a double-auction market institution. Based on a 
panel data analysis, our contribution shows that a non-salient tax reduces both the allocational and 
informational efficiency of the market with respect to the instance in which the tax is salient. Moreover, 
we show that the Liability Side Equivalence Principle does not hold in practice. 
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1. Introduction 
Neoclassical economic theory relies on the principle that agents’ decision making is always rational and 
self-interested, which is individuals behave as utility maximizers and properly process the available 
information. These principles also built up the foundation of public economic theory, leading to the 
central assumption that individuals fully optimize with respect to tax policies. While many classical 
contributions rely on this assumption (see, for example, Ramsey, 1927 and Miller, 1971), an increasing 
and leading body of research is showing that individuals’ behaviour often deviates from what the 
hypothesis of rational, self-interested and utility maximizer decision making would predict. Indeed, the 
recent development of behavioural economics has shed light on some heuristics and cognitive biases
3
 that 
undermine the pillars of classical economic theory. The relevant heuristics in our work is that of 
availability. The latter refers to the evidence that people overweight that kind of information which is 
more visible and prominent, i.e. more salient. While the concept of salience is widespread and attributa ble 
to countless economic fields (see Akerlof, 1991 for a betimes application of the concept of salience to 
economics), the first aim of this contribution is to explore the impact of the salience with respect to taxes. 
In the taxation framework, we use the concept of salience to represent the extent to which a tax provision 
is visible or prominent to taxpayers. 
Tax salience and the implication of tax perception was first recognised by John Stuart Mill (1848), who 
stated that: 
“Perhaps […] the money which [the taxpayer] is required to pay directly out of his pocket 
is the only taxation which he is quite sure that he pays at all. […] . If all taxes were direct, 
taxation would be much more perceived than at present; and there would be a security 
which now there is not, for economy in the public expenditure.”. 
In a seminal paper, Chetty et al. (2009) empirically studied the impact of tax salience on consumers’ price 
perception as well as the subsequent effect on the demand for the taxed goods. The authors implemented 
the following experiment at a Northern California grocery: while preserving the usual practice of posting 
tax-exclusive prices for control group products , the authors posted a tag reporting tax-inclusive prices 
below the original price tag for treatment group products . As a main result, Chetty et al. (2009) found that 
consumers were less prone to buy those products for which the tax-inclusive price was shown. More 
interestingly, given the demand price elasticity, they found that the demand reduction induced by showing 
tax-inclusive prices was roughly the same as that induced by a price increase equal to the excluded sales 
tax from the shelf. As a consequence, the only plausible conclusion was that consumers simply did not 
account for the tax scheme in making their purchasing decisions. In other words, the lesser salient the tax 
was, the lesser it was accounted for. 
Several papers report findings which are consistent with those of Chetty et al. (2009), see for example 
Finkelstein (2009), Gallager and Muehlegger (2008). Then, the main insight we learn from this literature 
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is that people overweight more prominent information, with the consequence that when the tax is less 
salient it induces a smaller response in subjects’ behaviour. 
As a second contribution, this paper aims at testing the experimental relevance of tax incidence.  
The latter is nowadays one of the most debated issues in public economics. The relevance of the topic 
comes from the fact that, in order to study the distributional effect of a tax system, it becomes crucial to 
understand who ultimately suffers the burden of the tax. In this sense, the well-known Liability-Side 
Equivalence Principle (LES) holds that the burden of a unit tax on buyers and sellers is independent of 
who actually pays the tax. In the Handbook of Public Economics, Fullerton and Metcalf (2002) 
distinguish between “economic incidence” and “statutory incidence”: that is the person who is legally 
committed to pay the tax may not be the person who ultimately bears the real tax burden. Thus , according 
to neoclassical public economic theory, the economic incidence of a tax depends solely on the relative 
elasticity of supply and demand, i.e. the more inelastic one bears the tax burden. In other words, buyers  
will bear more of the tax burden if demand schedule is more inelastic than  supply and vice-versa.  
Nevertheless, there is growing literature (see, for example, DellaVigna, 2007; Chetty et al., 2009; 
Slemrod, 2008; Biswas et al., 1993; Krishna et al., 2002), showing that other factors, such as behavioural 
and institutional factors might affect tax incidence. In this sense, Cox et al. (2012) studied the potential 
influence of market institutions on tax incidence. Effectively, there are many different types of markets, 
each of which has different properties and mechanisms for determining the price and the quantity traded 
between sellers and buyers. It is plausible to suppose that different market configurations might lead to 
different incidence results. Cox et al. (2012) address two important research questions: (A) Is tax 
incidence independent of the assignment of the liability to pay tax in experimental markets? (B) Is tax 
incidence independent of the market institution in experimental markets? In a laboratory experiment the 
authors compare two different market institutions: a double-auction market and a posted-offer market
4
. 
The experimental design was specifically designed to test whether the change of market institution or the 
assignment of the liability to pay tax may cause different results in terms of incidence. Contrarily to 
neoclassical predictions, Cox et al. (2012) findings reject both the hypotheses that tax incidence is 
independent of the assignment of liability to pay and that tax incidence is independent of the market 
institution
5
.  
While some research has shown that the theoretical prediction of LES holds in actuality (see, for example, 
Bork et al. 2002; Ruffle, 2005; Kachelmeier et al. 1994), other studies have reported a deviation from the 
standard theoretical framework (see, for example, Kerschbamer and Kirschsteiger, 1998). Interestingly, 
the latter study argues that statutory incidence may play a role in situations where social norms affect the 
final outcome: for instance the statutory incidence might create a sort of “moral commitment” to pay the 
tax. Indeed, implementing an ultimatum game à la Guth et al. (1982) in which the tax is levied on the 
proposer in one treatment and on the responder in the other treatment, Kerschbamer and Kirschsteiger 
(1998) report evidence that the market side on which the tax is levied exhibits a greater tax burden. 
Gamage and Shanske (2011) argued that in theory, offsetting tax burden can also alleviates most conflicts 
between the efficient revenue-raising advantages of reducing market salience and concerns related to 
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distribution, but they are uncertain of the extent to which the needed offsetting tax rate-adjustments will 
be politically feasible in practice.  
With the aim of extending the previous literature, we conduct a laboratory experiment that sheds light on 
the experimental relevance of tax salience and tax incidence. In particular, we aim at answering two 
questions: is market performance affected by the salience of the tax? Is the incidence of a tax independent 
of which side of the market it is levied on (Liability Side Equivalence Principle, LES)?  We address these 
questions by designing a laboratory experiment with within-subject variations, in which subjects trade a 
fictitious good in a double-auction market as pioneered by Smith (1962). The choice of this trading 
institution is due to the evidence that countless experiments have shown that these markets exhibit a rapid 
price convergence to the competitive equilibrium price as well as efficient allocations (see , for example, 
Smith, 1976; Smith and Williams, 1983; Smith et al., 1982). For this reason, double auction markets have 
also been widely used as a benchmark for testing the performance of other institutions (see, for example, 
Ketcham et al., 1984). We compare ST (Salient Tax) with NST (Non-Salient Tax) tasks to answer our 
first research question and then tax-on-buyer with tax-on-seller tasks to answer our second research 
question. Our contribution innovates the previous literature in two main points. First we focus on the 
impact of tax salience and incidence in terms of market allocational and informational efficiency; second 
we provide experimental evidence of what has been so far investigated through the use of field 
experiments and theoretical models. In this perspective, laboratory experiments are particularly well 
suited to the purpose at hand. Indeed, they are performed in a controlled environment in which it is 
possible to control for all the factors that are supposed to be relevant as well as to avoid many 
econometric problems of observational data analysis. This way one can be assured that resulting 
experimental data cannot be useless or misleading in testing theory assumptions. As a further point, the 
major empirical challenge for economists is going beyond correlation analysis to provide insights on 
causation. While economics has been served well by using precise models and econometric techniques for 
answering causal questions on taxation using variations in naturally occurring data, the expanding use of 
controlled laboratory experimentation is an important recent development – pushed by the behavioural 
economics revolution – to provide insights on causation. 
The next sections describe our experimental design in detail (section 2), and discuss our findings (section 
3). Section 4 concludes.  
 
2. Experimental design 
2.1. An overview 
We conduct a laboratory experiment in which subjects trade one unit of a fictitious good in a double -
auction market. The experiment
6
 was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fishbacher, 
2007). The experimental design consists of nine tasks (see Table 1): 
 
 
                                                                 
6 
Figure 1A in the appendix depicts a screenshot of the experimental market place for a seller in the task with no tax imposition. 
5 
 
Table 1: Summary of Experimental Tasks 
Task Task Tag Task Description 
1 NT No Tax  
2 STB4 Salient Tax on Buyer (4 ECU) 
3 STS4 Salient Tax on Seller (4 ECU) 
4 STB8 Salient Tax on Buyer (8 ECU) 
5 STS8 Salient Tax on Seller (8 ECU) 
6 NSTB4 Non-salient Tax on Buyer (4 ECU) 
7 NSTS4 Non-salient Tax on Seller (4 ECU) 
8 NSTB8 Non-salient Tax on Buyer (8 ECU) 
9 NSTS8 Non-salient Tax on Seller (8 ECU) 
 
1. A task in which subjects face an induced stationary demand and supply schedule7 with no tax 
imposition (NT); 
2. A task with subjects facing a demand schedule with reserve prices that are implicitly reduced by 
the amount of a 4 ECU excise tax on buyers (STB4); 
3. A task with subjects facing a supply schedule with cost values that are implicitly incremented by 
the amount of a 4 ECU excise tax on sellers (STS4); 
4. A task with subjects facing a demand schedule with reserve prices that are implicitly reduced by 
the amount of an 8 ECU excise tax on buyers (STB8); 
5. A task with subjects facing a supply schedule with cost values that are implicitly incremented by 
the amount of an 8 ECU excise tax on sellers (STS8); 
6. A task in which subjects face the no tax task schedules with the explicit imposition of a 4 ECU 
excise tax on buyers (NSTB4); 
7. A task in which subjects face the no tax task schedules with the explicit imposition of a 4 ECU 
excise tax on sellers (NSTS4); 
8. A task in which subjects face the no tax task schedules with the explicit imposition of an 8 ECU 
excise tax on buyers (NSTB8); 
9. A task in which subjects face the no tax task schedules with the explicit imposition of an 8 ECU 
excise tax on sellers (NSTS8). 
Particularly, in ST tasks it is assumed that showing a price or a cost value ,which includes the excise tax, 
makes it more perceptible and therefore more salient. However, in NST tasks, values do not include tax, 
and consumers face a cognitive cost of computing the actual price or cost in the presence of a lower tax 
salience. Setting two different sizes of the excise tax (4 and 8 ECU) allows us to determine whether a 
higher tax may lead to different effects on traders’ behaviour ceteris paribus. In this way, we can be 
assured that ST tasks will have the same parameterizations of NST tasks and will be comparable from a 
theoretical standpoint. In fact, the translation of supply and demand schedules due to explicit tax 
imposition in NST tasks will lead to equivalence with ST task schedules. Clearly, the ST tasks can 
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accurately represent situations in which the “in-front-of-the-shelf” consumer is shown the tax-inclusive 
price. Conversely, NST tasks represent situations in which the consumer is shown the tax-exclusive price. 
In this case, as frequently happens, the tax will be added (and hence it will become more salient) only at 
the checkout.  
The experiment was conducted in the “Lee” Laboratory for economic research at the University “ Jaume 
I” of Castellón (Spain). Participants were 138 undergraduate students, particularly freshmen. We ran six 
sessions over some regular days in September 2014. Each session consisted of the nine tasks reported 
above and lasted about 100 minutes; tasks order was randomised across sessions. The subjects’ role 
(buyer or seller) as well as costs and values were randomly assigned at the beginning of each task and 
were the same throughout the entire task, but they differed across tasks. At first, subjects were given a 
hard copy of the instructions . Subjects were allowed to ask questions either publically or privately to 
clarify any doubts. Trading activities were performed by adopting Experimental Currency Units (ECU) as 
the currency during the experiment. At the end of each session, subjects were paid their cumulative 
earnings according to the conversion rate of 10 ECU=1€. 
 
2.2 Session description 
In each session buyers and sellers trade the good in a double-auction market that is opened for 90 seconds 
in each trading period. The trading screen of all participants always displays the lower “ask” and the 
higher “bid”. One contract is closed whenever a seller accepts the outstanding “bid” or a buyer accepts 
the outstanding “ask”. Traders are sited in a manner that their privacy is protected, also they are not 
allowed to communicate with each other. This procedure is identical for all tasks. Each session includes 9 
tasks. In each tasks both buyers and sellers have 1 unit of a fictitious good to trade. All subjects first trade 
in 2 practice periods and then in 7 relevant periods in a given task. We induce different demand and 
supply curves in each market. The demand and supply schedule remain fixed across periods in a given 
tasks, but they differ among tasks to gauge tax salience impact. In the NT tasks, subjects trade with the 
stationary demand and supply schedule in the absence of tax as shown in Figure 1. 
The predicted equilibrium occurs where the curves intersect the quantity equal to 11, and the price 
between 44 and 46 (we assume 45 as the equilibrium price for surplus calculus). As mentioned above, in 
the four ST tasks, the amount of the excise tax has been deducted from values or added to costs, 
depending on the legal responsibility to pay. In the STB4 task the demand schedule is shifted by 4 ECU 
compared to the previous setting. This means that the tax is imposed on the buyer and values have been 
adjusted for the respective tax amount. In this case the equilibrium occurs with a quantity equal to 10 and 
a price equal to 43 ECU (see Figure 1A in the appendix). In terms of incidence, the STS4 task is 
theoretically equivalent to the previous  (see Figure 1B in the appendix). The supply schedule is shifted 
by 4 ECU because sellers pay the tax. The equilibrium occurs with a quantity equal to 10 and a price 
equal to 47 ECU. The introduction of an 8 ECU excise tax determines an equilibrium quantity equal to 9 
for both STB8 and STS8 tasks and an equilibrium price equal to 41 ECU and 49 ECU respectively. The 
supply and demand schedules related to these tasks are shown in Figures 1C and 1D respectively. 
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 Figure 1: Demand and Supply schedule in NT tasks (Session1) 
 
In contrast, NST tasks always resort to the no-tax demand and supply schedules. We know from theory 
that the imposition of an excise tax will shift schedules to the exact tax amount, as subjects must 
necessarily consider taxes in their personal assessment. In particular, if the tax is imposed on the buyer, 
the maximum that he is willing to pay will be equal to the sum of the good ’s price and the tax. Likewise, 
if the tax is imposed on the seller, the tax will be considered as an additional cost to those already 
incurred in the production and/or sale activities. This implies , for example, that if the buyer is aware of 
the application of an excise tax, then he should rationally consider paying the tax in the maximum 
assigned value, resulting in a downward shift of its demand curve. On the other hand, in the presence of 
perfect rationality, the seller will consider the tax as an additional cost that will raise its supply curve. 
This way, ST and NST tasks are theoretically equivalent and allow a proper assessment of the effects of 
greater or lesser tax salience. More precisely, the STB4 task is equivalent to the NSTB4 task; the STS4 
task is equivalent to the NSTS4 task; the STB8 task is equivalent to the NSTB8 task and the STS8 task is 
equivalent to the NSTS8 task. In the appendix, we list all theoretical and experimental values of price, 
quantity, total surplus, as well as buyers’ and sellers’ surplus in reference to the first session setting (see 
Table 2-13). 
 
3. Analysis and Results 
In the light of our experimental design, a panel data model is employed to exploit both the cross -sectional 
and the time series dimension of our data. In particular, our experiment deals with a perfectly balanced 
panel, which involves 138 subjects (cross -sectional units), each observed over 63 trading periods
8
 (time 
units). The analysis is based on the following panel regression equation:  
𝑦𝑖 ,𝑡 = 𝜇 + 𝛽 ∙ 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑖 ,𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 ,𝑡 
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where y is a generic placeholder for the dependent variable
9
 we take into account, 𝜇
 
stands for the 
intercept term, 𝛼 is the individual effect which is assumed to be time invariant within each cross -sectional 
unit and 𝜀  is the residual error component which is assumed to be independent and identically distributed 
over individuals and time. TaxType is a categorical variable which captures the effect of the different tax 
specifications. In particular, TaxType takes on value 1 if subjects are performing the first task (No Tax 
framework), value 2 if subjects are going through the second task (Salience Tax on Buyer 4 ECU) and so 
on up to value 9 if subjects are performing the ninth task (Non Salient Tax on Seller 8 ECU). TaxType 
equal to 1 (No Tax) is chosen as a reference (omitted) category of our model. This implies that, in a first 
step, the effect of each tax specification is measured with reference to the omitted category, i.e. to the no 
tax case. Secondly, to bring light on the effect of salience, we perform pairwise comparisons across the 
ninth levels of our categorical variable. 
To start with, the main effects of each tax specification are est imated through Pooled OLS, Fixed 
Effects and Random Effects models. Time after time, the Breusch – Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test 
is performed to assess whether a Random Effects model outperforms a Pooled OLS model, the F-Test is 
employed to choose between a Fixed Effects and a Pooled OLS model and, finally, the Hausman test is 
used to choose between Random and Fixed Effects models. 
As a second step, the predictions from the selected model have been using to compute the average 
predictive margins for each level of the categorical variable (TaxType). Differently speaking, a margin for 
a given level of the categorical variable corresponds to the predicted average of the dependent variable, 
treating all observations as if they belonged to that level. Then, contrasts
10
 of margins have been 
computed and pairwise comparisons across levels have been carried out to evaluate the effect of each tax 
design in terms of salience, incidence and tax sixe. Reference for the use of margins and contrasts can be 
found in Searle (1971, 1997). 
 
3.1. Allocational Efficiency 
Theoretically speaking, the equivalence relationship of the salient (ST) and non -salient (NST) tax 
specifications implies that buyers and sellers should equally share profits from the trading activity. 
Clearly, our experimental design requires a different calculation of the surplus for different tasks. Since in 
ST tasks subjects face tax-inclusive values, the surplus is equal to 𝑆𝑏 = 𝑣 − 𝑝 for buyers and 𝑆𝑠 = 𝑝 − 𝑐  
for sellers, where 𝑆𝑏 and 𝑆𝑠 are buyers and sellers’ surplus, respectively; 𝑣 denotes the private reservation 
values, 𝑝 is the unit price and 𝑐  is the marginal cost. Differently, in NST tasks, subjects deal with tax-
exclusive values and have to face the cognitive cost to discount the tax size in their reservation and cost 
values. In the latter cases, buyers’ surplus is computed as 𝑆𝑏 = 𝑣 − (𝑝 + 𝜏) and sellers’ surplus as 
𝑆𝑠 = 𝑝 − (𝑐 + 𝜏), where 𝜏 denotes the unit tax. 
Market allocational efficiency is calculated as follows: 
𝑒 =
∑ 𝑝𝑟
𝑖𝑖∈𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠
𝑠𝑠 + 𝑠𝑏
× 100 
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This index, introduced by Gode and Sunder (1997), is defined as the ratio between the total actual 
profit and the theoretical profit. While the former is the sum of profits made by each trader - where 𝑝𝑟𝑖  
stands for the profit of trader 𝑖 - the latter is the sum of theoretical buyers’, 𝑠𝑏, and sellers’, 𝑠𝑠, surplus. 
This index converges 100% whenever subjects extract the maximum potential profit from trading. We 
decompose this index to compute both buyers and sellers’ allocational efficiency. In the former case we 
only consider profits earned by buyers (in the numerator) and the potential buyers surplus (in the 
denominator); in the latter case we only account for sellers realized profits (in the numerator) and for the 
potential sellers surplus (in the denominator). Splitting this index up into buyers and sellers alllocational 
efficiency allows us to investigate the effect of the different tax specifications on both buyers and sellers’ 
allocational efficiency. 
Table 2 below shows the regression output of the three models using the natural log of the buyer 
allocation efficiency as a dependent variable.  
 
Dependent Variable: Buyer Allocational Efficiency 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Pooled OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects 
    
TaxType = 2, STB4 -0.0973*** -0.0973*** -0.0973*** 
 (0.0132) (0.0125) (0.0125) 
TaxType = 3, STS4 0.0783*** 0.0783*** 0.0783*** 
 (0.0132) (0.0125) (0.0125) 
TaxType = 4, STB8 -0.169*** -0.169*** -0.169*** 
 (0.0132) (0.0125) (0.0125) 
TaxType = 5, STS8 0.0287** 0.0287** 0.0287** 
 (0.0132) (0.0125) (0.0125) 
TaxType = 6, NSTB4 -0.159*** -0.159*** -0.159*** 
 (0.0132) (0.0125) (0.0125) 
TaxType = 7, NSTS4 0.117*** 0.117*** 0.117*** 
 (0.0132) (0.0125) (0.0125) 
TaxType = 8, NSTB8 -0.529*** -0.529*** -0.529*** 
 (0.0132) (0.0125) (0.0125) 
TaxType = 9, NSTS8 0.0825*** 0.0825*** 0.0825*** 
 (0.0132) (0.0125) (0.0125) 
Constant 4.579*** 4.579*** 4.579*** 
 (0.00936) (0.00881) (0.0122) 
    
Observations 8,694 8,694 8,694 
R-squared 0.298 0.328  
Number of Subject  138 138 
Standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 2: Regression on Buyer Allocational Efficiency 
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Figure 2 and Table 3 report the margins on the Random Effect model. The full list of contrasts is 
available in Table 1B (Appendix B). 
 
Figure 2: Margins on Random Effects Model 
As a first result, assuming the No Tax framework (NT) as a reference category, a negative and 
significant impact on buyers ’ allocational efficiency is detected whenever the tax is legally levied on 
buyers. On the opposite, a positive and significant impact on buyers ’ allocational efficiency is observed 
when the tax is levied on sellers. Our results show that tax salience matters. Indeed, comparing a Salient 
Tax of 4 ECU levied on buyers (STB4) with a Non Salient Tax of 4 ECU levied on buyers (NSTB4), we 
observe that the buyers allocational efficiency is lower in the latter case. Still, comparing a Salient Tax of 
8 ECU levied on buyers (STB8) with a Non Salient Tax of 8 ECU levied on buyers (NSTB8), the same 
achievement is reached. It is interesting to note that, when the tax sixe is 8 ECU, the decrease in the 
allocational efficiency caused by the introduction of a non-salient tax specification is still more 
accentuated (with respect to the 4 ECU tax), with a contrast of 0.36 (against a contrast of about 0.07). 
This result points out that a non-salient tax induces subjects to fall prey into accounting errors, which 
lower their allocational efficiency. Then, keeping equal the subject category who pays the tax as we ll as 
the tax sixe, we find that a non-salient tax structure negatively impacts on allocational efficiency.  
Tax Type Margin Std. Err. 
Unadjusted  
Groups
11
 
NSTB8 4.050 0.012 
 STB8 4.410 0.012 A 
NSTB4 4.419 0.012 A 
STB4 4.481 0.012 
 NT 4.579 0.012 
 STS8 4.607 0.012 
 STS4 4.657 0.012 B 
NSTS8 4.661 0.012 B 
NSTS4 4.696 0.012   
Table 3: Margins on Random Effects Model 
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Table 4 shows the regression output of the three models using the natural log of the seller allocation 
efficiency as a dependent variable. 
Dependent Variable: Seller Allocational Efficiency 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Pooled OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects 
    
TaxType = 2, STB4 0.0486*** 0.0486*** 0.0486*** 
 (0.00972) (0.00882) (0.00882) 
TaxType = 3, STS4 -0.194*** -0.194*** -0.194*** 
 (0.00972) (0.00882) (0.00882) 
TaxType = 4, STB8 0.0774*** 0.0774*** 0.0774*** 
 (0.00972) (0.00882) (0.00882) 
TaxType = 5, STS8 -0.328*** -0.328*** -0.328*** 
 (0.00972) (0.00882) (0.00882) 
TaxType = 6, NSTB4 0.0627*** 0.0627*** 0.0627*** 
 (0.00972) (0.00882) (0.00882) 
TaxType = 7, NSTS4 -0.310*** -0.310*** -0.310*** 
 (0.00972) (0.00882) (0.00882) 
TaxType = 8, NSTB8 0.174*** 0.174*** 0.174*** 
 (0.00972) (0.00882) (0.00882) 
TaxType = 9, NSTS8 -0.312*** -0.312*** -0.312*** 
 (0.00972) (0.00882) (0.00882) 
Constant 4.546*** 4.546*** 4.546*** 
 (0.00687) (0.00624) (0.00988) 
    
Observations 8,694 8,694 8,694 
R-squared 0.433 0.485  
Number of Subject  138 138 
Standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 4: Regression on Seller Allocational Efficiency 
 
Figure 3 and Table 5 report the margins on the Random Effect model. The full list of contrasts is 
available in Table 2B (Appendix B). As a main result, with respect to the control (i.e. NT task), a negative 
and significant effect on seller allocational efficiency is observed when the tax is levied on sellers. On the 
opposite, a tax levied on buyers produces a positive and significant impact on sellers allocational 
efficiency. As in the previous case, we find that the subject category (buyer or seller) who is legally taxed 
experiences a reduction in his own allocational efficiency, at the advantage of the other subject category. 
Also in this case, we detect evidence of reduction in the allocational efficiency of the taxed subject 
category depending on salience of the tax. Indeed, comparing a Salient Tax of 4 ECU levied on sellers 
(STS4) with a Non Salient Tax of 4 ECU levied on sellers (NSTS4), we find that a non -salient tax 
decreases the allocational efficiency of sellers. Nevertheless, the same achievement is not detected when a 
salient tax on sellers of 8 ECU (STS8) is compared with a non-salient tax on sellers of 8 ECU (NSTS8). 
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Figure 3: Margins on Random Effects Model 
 
To test whether the tax incidence equivalence principle holds, we take into consideration the market 
allocational efficiency and, assuming the no tax condition as a benchmark, we study whether it varies 
depending on the subject (buyer or seller) who pays the excise tax. 
Tax Type Margin Std. Err. 
Unadjusted  
Groups
12
 
STS8 4.218 0.009 A 
NSTS8 4.234 0.009 AB 
NSTS4 4.235 0.009 B 
STS4 4.351 0.009 
 NT 4.546 0.009 
 STB4 4.594 0.009 C 
NSTB4 4.608 0.009 CD 
STB8 4.623 0.009 D 
NSTB8 4.720 0.009   
Table 5: Margins on Random Effects Model 
 
Table 6 shows the regression output of the three models using the natural log of the market allocation 
efficiency as a dependent variable.  
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Dependent Variable: Market Allocational Efficiency 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Pooled OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects 
    
TaxType = 2, STB4 -0.0236*** -0.0236*** -0.0236*** 
 (0.00527) (0.00486) (0.00486) 
TaxType = 3, STS4 -0.0417*** -0.0417*** -0.0417*** 
 (0.00527) (0.00486) (0.00486) 
TaxType = 4, STB8 -0.0349*** -0.0349*** -0.0349*** 
 (0.00527) (0.00486) (0.00486) 
TaxType = 5, STS8 -0.105*** -0.105*** -0.105*** 
 (0.00527) (0.00486) (0.00486) 
TaxType = 6, NSTB4 -0.0238*** -0.0238*** -0.0238*** 
 (0.00527) (0.00486) (0.00486) 
TaxType = 7, NSTS4 -0.0616*** -0.0616*** -0.0616*** 
 (0.00527) (0.00486) (0.00486) 
TaxType = 8, NSTB8 -0.0888*** -0.0888*** -0.0888*** 
 (0.00527) (0.00486) (0.00486) 
TaxType = 9, NSTS8 -0.0840*** -0.0840*** -0.0840*** 
 (0.00527) (0.00486) (0.00486) 
Constant 4.570*** 4.570*** 4.570*** 
 (0.00373) (0.00344) (0.00513) 
    
Observations 8,694 8,694 8,694 
R-squared 0.076 0.090  
Number of Subject  138 138 
Standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 6: Regression on Market Allocational Efficiency 
Figure 4 and Table 7 report the margins on the Random Effect model. The full list of contrasts is 
available in Table 3B (Appendix B). As we can see, the introduction of a tax (in all its specifications) has 
a negative and significant effect on market allocational efficiency. Interestingly, for any given salience 
specification and tax size, the impact of the tax on the total allocational efficiency varies depending on the 
subject category who pays the tax. Indeed, a salient tax of 4 ECU promotes lower allocational efficiency 
when it is levied on sellers rather than on buyers (see comparison STB4 vs. STS4). The same 
achievement is detected comparing a salient tax on buyers of 8 ECU (STB8,) with a salient tax of the 
same size levied on sellers (STS8). Still, a non-salient tax of 4 ECU leads to lower allocational efficiency 
when it is levied on sellers (see comparison NSTB4 vs. NSTS4). No significant results are achieved with 
a non-salient tax of 8 ECU. 
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Figure 4: Margins on Random Effects Model 
 
Tax Type Margin Std. Err. 
Unadjusted  
Groups
13
 
STS8 4.464 0.005 
 NSTB8 4.480 0.005 A 
NSTS8 4.485 0.005 A 
NSTS4 4.508 0.005 
 STS4 4.528 0.005 B 
STS8 4.534 0.005 B 
NSTB4 4.545 0.005 C 
STB4 4.546 0.005 C 
NT 4.569 0.005   
Table 7: Margins on Random Effects Model 
 
3.2. Informational efficiency 
Following Vernon Smith (1962), we measure the accuracy of the price discovery process by computing 
the root mean square error between each of the n transaction prices (for i=1…n) over a given period and 
the equilibrium price (𝑝0 ) of that period, expressed as a percentage of the equilibrium price. Substantially, 
the Smith’s Alpha captures the standard deviation of actual prices over the theoretical equilibrium value.  
𝛼 =
100
𝑝0
√
1
𝑛
∑(𝑝𝑖 − 𝑝0 )
𝑛
𝑖 =1
 
Then, a lower value of this index is desirable, since it would imply that trading prices exhibit lower 
deviations from the market equilibrium price. 
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Table 8 shows the regression output of the three models using the Smith’s Alpha as a dependent 
variable.  
Dependent Variable: Smith’s Alpha 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Pooled OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects 
    
TaxType = 2, STB4 0.302 0.302* 0.302* 
 (0.248) (0.161) (0.161) 
TaxType = 3, STS4 1.658*** 1.658*** 1.658*** 
 (0.248) (0.161) (0.161) 
TaxType = 4, STB8 1.694*** 1.694*** 1.694*** 
 (0.248) (0.161) (0.161) 
TaxType = 5, STS8 3.787*** 3.787*** 3.787*** 
 (0.248) (0.161) (0.161) 
TaxType = 6, NSTB4 2.549*** 2.549*** 2.549*** 
 (0.248) (0.161) (0.161) 
TaxType = 7, NSTS4 2.511*** 2.511*** 2.511*** 
 (0.248) (0.161) (0.161) 
TaxType = 8, NSTB8 4.009*** 4.009*** 4.009*** 
 (0.248) (0.161) (0.161) 
TaxType = 9, NSTS8 5.341*** 5.341*** 5.341*** 
 (0.248) (0.161) (0.161) 
Constant 5.230*** 5.230*** 5.230*** 
 (0.176) (0.114) (0.373) 
    
Observations 8,694 8,694 8,694 
R-squared 0.083 0.181  
Number of Subject  138 138 
Standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 8: Regression on Smith’s Alpha 
 
Figure 5 and Table 9 report the margins on the Random Effect model. The full list of contrasts is 
available in Table 4B (Appendix B). 
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Figure 5: Margins on Random Effects Model 
 
Tax Type Margin Std.  Err. 
Unadjusted 
Groups
14
 
NT 5.229 0.372 A 
STB4 5.531 0.372 A 
STS4 6.888 0.372 B 
STB8 6.923 0.372 B 
NSTS4 7.741 0.372 C 
NSTB4 7.779 0.372 C 
STS8 9.016 0.372 D 
NSTB8 9.238 0.372 D 
NSTS8 10.57 0.372   
Table 9: Margins on Random Effects Model 
In general terms, our results show that any tax specification induces a negative impact on the 
informational efficiency of the market, compared with the no-tax control treatment. What is particularly 
interesting in our context is that the salience of the tax does have a significant impact in terms on 
informational efficiency. More precisely, we find that, for any subject category and tax size, a non -salient 
tax specification worsens the market informational efficiency with respect to a salient tax specification. 
Indeed, a non-salient tax on buyer of 4 ECU promotes lower informational efficiency than a salient tax on 
buyers of 4 ECU (see STB4 vs. NSTB4). Similarly, a non-salient tax of 8 ECU levied on buyers (NSTB8) 
makes the market informationally less efficient than a salient tax on buyers of 8 ECU (STB8). The same 
achievements hold when the tax is levied on sellers (see comparisons STS4 vs. NSTS4 and STS8 vs. 
NSTS8). 
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4. Conclusion and discussion 
In spite of the centrality of standard theoretical predictions in public economics, the recent advances in 
behavioural economics have emphasized the role of several heuristics and cognitive biases in affecting 
subjects’ decisions and their response with respect to taxation. Tax salience and tax incidence have been 
two of the most discussed concerns in recent years, probably because of the policy implications they carry. 
The idea that customers exhibit some sensitivity to the visibility of a tax may lead the government to use 
the salience as a fiscal tool. Still, whether or not behavioural and institutional factors affect the repartition 
of the tax burden between buyers and sellers needs to be accounted for because of its implications on the 
distributional effects of a tax system. In the last decade, these issues have motivated researchers to focus on 
individual’s  behavioural responses to taxes. Taking advantage of the use of experimental techniques, our 
contribution sheds light on the impact of tax salience and tax incidence on market performance. In 
particular, we evaluate market performance in terms of its allocational and informational efficiency. While 
the index proposed by Gode and Sunder (1997) is taken into account as a measure for allocational 
efficiency, Smith’s alpha is used to test market informational efficiency. Our results show that, for a given 
market side (buyer and seller) and tax size, switching from a salient to a non-salient tax specification 
reduces both market allocational and informational efficiency. Furthermore, we find that, for any size, a 
different impact on market allocational efficiency is detected depending on which side of the market the tax 
is levied on. Then, we conclude that both tax salience and tax incidence matter. While our contribution has 
to be thought as an experimental test of what has been so far investigated through the use of field 
experiments and theoretical models, much work is needed to shed light on the main drivers responsible for 
tax misperception. In this sense, several cognitive biases might be at work. For instance, the “availability” 
bias may lead subject to under-evaluate that kind of information which is not salient. Another poss ible 
explanation could instead be related to the “anchoring” bias, which causes people to anchor their 
evaluations to a starting point and make them fail to properly account for the arrival of new information. 
Then, customers who are affected by this bias might think that the final price will be very similar to the 
original one than to any other price. Moreover, framing of prices may affect subjects’ decisions (see 
Tversky and Kahneman, 1986). Last but not least, tax misperception may simply be due to the fact that 
calculation costs exceed the related benefits. In this perspective, we think that further research is still 
needed to explore the potential source of tax misperception. 
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Appendix A 
Figure 1A: Screenshot of the experimental market place for a seller in the task NT 
 
 
Figure 1A: Demand and Supply schedule in STB4 task  
 
Figure 1B: Demand and Supply schedule in STS4 task (Session 1) 
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Figure 1C: Demand and Supply schedule in STB8 task (Session 1) 
 
 
Figure 1D: Demand and Supply schedule in STS8 task (Session 1) 
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Table 2: Theoretical values from Session 1 
Theoretical Values 
Task 
Equilibrium 
Price 
Equilibrium 
Quantity 
Equilibrium 
Surplus 
Buyers' 
Surplus 
Sellers' 
Surplus 
Buyers' 
Surplus (%) 
Sellers' 
Surplus (%) 
1 45 11 242 121 121 50 50 
2 43 10 200 100 100 50 50 
3 47 10 200 100 100 50 50 
4 41 9 162 81 81 50 50 
5 49 9 162 81 81 50 50 
6 43 10 200 100 100 50 50 
7 47 10 200 100 100 50 50 
8 41 9 162 81 81 50 50 
9 49 9 162 81 81 50 50 
 
Table 3: Theoretical values from Session 2 
Task 
Theoretical Values 
Equilibrium 
Price  
Equilibrium 
Quantity 
Equilibrium 
Surplus 
Buyers' 
Surplus 
Sellers' 
Surplus 
Buyers' 
Surplus (%) 
Sellers' 
Surplus (%) 
1 45 8 128 64 64 50 50 
2 43 7 98 49 49 50 50 
3 47 7 98 49 49 50 50 
4 49 6 72 36 36 50 50 
5 41 6 72 36 36 50 50 
6 43 7 98 49 49 50 50 
7 47 7 98 49 49 50 50 
8 49 6 72 36 36 50 50 
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9 41 6 72 36 36 50 50 
 
Table 4: Theoretical values from Session 3 
Task 
Theoretical Values 
Equilibrium 
Price  
Equilibrium 
Quantity 
Equilibrium 
Surplus 
Buyers' 
Surplus 
Sellers' 
Surplus 
Buyers' 
Surplus (%) 
Sellers' 
Surplus (%) 
1 45 8 128 64 64 50 50 
2 43 7 98 49 49 50 50 
3 47 7 98 49 49 50 50 
4 41 6 72 36 36 50 50 
5 49 6 72 36 36 50 50 
6 43 7 98 49 49 50 50 
7 47 7 98 49 49 50 50 
8 41 6 72 36 36 50 50 
9 49 6 72 36 36 50 50 
 
Table 5: Theoretical values from Session 4 
Task 
Theoretical Values 
Equilibrium 
Price  
Equilibrium 
Quantity 
Equilibrium 
Surplus 
Buyers' 
Surplus 
Sellers' 
Surplus 
Buyers' 
Surplus (%) 
Sellers' 
Surplus (%) 
1 45 13 338 169 169 50 50 
2 43 12 288 144 144 50 50 
3 47 12 288 144 144 50 50 
4 41 11 242 121 121 50 50 
5 49 11 242 121 121 50 50 
6 43 12 288 144 144 50 50 
7 47 12 288 144 144 50 50 
8 41 11 242 121 121 50 50 
9 49 11 242 121 121 50 50 
 
Table 6: Theoretical values from Session 5 
Task 
Theoretical Values 
Equilibrium 
Price  
Equilibrium 
Quantity 
Equilibrium 
Surplus 
Buyers' 
Surplus 
Sellers' 
Surplus 
Buyers' 
Surplus (%) 
Sellers' 
Surplus (%) 
1 45 8 128 64 64 50 50 
2 43 7 98 49 49 50 50 
3 47 7 98 49 49 50 50 
4 41 6 72 36 36 50 50 
5 49 6 72 36 36 50 50 
6 43 7 98 49 49 50 50 
7 47 7 98 49 49 50 50 
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8 41 6 72 36 36 50 50 
9 49 6 72 36 36 50 50 
 
Table 7: Theoretical values from Session 6 
Task 
Theoretical Values 
Equilibrium 
Price  
Equilibrium 
Quantity 
Equilibrium 
Surplus 
Buyers' 
Surplus 
Sellers' 
Surplus 
Buyers' 
Surplus (%) 
Sellers' 
Surplus (%) 
1 45 8 128 64 64 50 50 
2 43 7 98 49 49 50 50 
3 47 7 98 49 49 50 50 
4 41 6 72 36 36 50 50 
5 49 6 72 36 36 50 50 
6 43 7 98 49 49 50 50 
7 47 7 98 49 49 50 50 
8 41 6 72 36 36 50 50 
9 49 6 72 36 36 50 50 
 
 
Table 8: Experimental values from Session 1 
Task 
Experimental Values 
Equilibrium 
Price* 
Equilibrium 
Quantity** 
Equilibrium 
Surplus *** 
Buyers' 
Surplus 
Sellers' 
Surplus 
Buyers' 
Surplus (%) 
Sellers' 
Surplus (%) 
1 45 11 240 137 103 57 43 
2 43 11 194 102 92 52 48 
3 43 10 192 125 67 65 35 
4 42 9 157 65 92 41 59 
5 47 10 152 99 53 65 35 
6 43 10 198 113 85 57 43 
7 44 10 191 123 68 64 36 
8 42 10 153 69 84 45 55 
9 46 9 151 94 57 62 38 
 *median equilibrium price **median equilibrium quantity ***average equilibrium surplus  
 
Table 9: Experimental values from Session 2 
Task 
Experimental Values 
Equilibrium 
Price* 
Equilibrium 
Quantity** 
Equilibrium 
Surplus*** 
Buyers' 
Surplus 
Sellers' 
Surplus 
Buyers' 
Surplus (%) 
Sellers' 
Surplus (%) 
1 45 8 124 61 62 49 50 
2 44 7 95 39 56 41 59 
3 46 7 95 51 44 54 46 
4 48,5 6 70 38 32 54 46 
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5 43 6 69 25 44 36 64 
6 44 7 91 34 57 37 63 
7 47 7 90 46 44 51 49 
8 44 7 58 10 49 17 84 
9 47 6 62 37 25 60 40 
 *median equilibrium price **median equilibrium quantity ***average equilibrium surplus  
 
Table 10: Experimental values from Session 3 
Task 
Experimental Values 
Equilibrium 
Price* 
Equilibrium 
Quantity** 
Equilibrium 
Surplus*** 
Buyers' 
Surplus 
Sellers' 
Surplus 
Buyers' 
Surplus (%) 
Sellers' 
Surplus (%) 
1 45 8 122 56 66 46 54 
2 42 7 91 46 45 51 49 
3 45 7 92 54 38 59 41 
4 42 6 71 29 41 41 58 
5 49 6 68 39 29 57 43 
6 44 7 97 39 58 40 60 
7 46 7 95 58 38 61 40 
8 43 6 68 23 45 34 66 
9 48 7 65 42 22 65 34 
 *median equilibrium price **median equilibrium quantity ***average equilibrium surplus  
Table 11: Experimental values from Session 4 
Task 
Experimental Values 
Equilibrium 
Price* 
Equilibrium 
Quantity** 
Equilibrium 
Surplus*** 
Buyers' 
Surplus 
Sellers' 
Surplus 
Buyers' 
Surplus (%) 
Sellers' 
Surplus (%) 
1 44 13 320 152 169 48 53 
2 44 13 269 114 154 42 57 
3 45 13 276 134 142 49 51 
4 43 12 229 99 130 43 57 
5 46 11 232 153 79 66 34 
6 44 13 281 153 128 54 46 
7 45 13 274 157 117 57 43 
8 42 12 220 90 131 41 60 
9 46 13 220 124 96 56 44 
 *median equilibrium price **median equilibrium quantity ***average equilibrium surplus  
 
Table 12: Experimental values from Session 5 
Task 
Experimental Values 
Equilibrium 
Price* 
Equilibrium 
Quantity** 
Equilibrium 
Surplus*** 
Buyers' 
Surplus 
Sellers' 
Surplus 
Buyers' 
Surplus (%) 
Sellers' 
Surplus (%) 
1 45 8 120 58 62 48 52 
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2 43 6 91 45 46 49 51 
3 45 7 86 53 33 62 38 
4 42 5 63 28 34 44 54 
5 46 4 52 34 18 65 35 
6 43 7 87 35 52 40 60 
7 44 5 81 54 27 67 33 
8 42 6 62 24 38 39 61 
9 48 5 62 37 25 60 40 
 *median equilibrium price **median equilibrium quantity ***average equilibrium surplus  
 
Table 13: Experimental values from Session 6 
Task 
Experimental Values 
Equilibrium 
Price* 
Equilibrium 
Quantity** 
Equilibrium 
Surplus*** 
Buyers' 
Surplus 
Sellers' 
Surplus 
Buyers' 
Surplus (%) 
Sellers' 
Surplus (%) 
1 45 8 124 66 58 53 47 
2 43 7 95 45 50 47 53 
3 46 7 93 50 43 54 46 
4 42 6 67 27 40 40 60 
5 48 5 63 37 25 59 40 
6 44 7 96 44 53 46 55 
7 46 7 94 51 43 54 46 
8 41 6 65 28 37 43 57 
9 48 6 66 40 27 61 41 
 *median equilibrium price **median equilibrium quantity ***average equilibrium surplus  
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Appendix B 
 
Table 1B: Contrasts on Buyer Allocational Efficiency 
 
 
Table 2B: Contrasts on Seller Allocational Efficiency 
                                                                                 
NSTS8 vs NSTB8      .6110197    .012453    49.07   0.000     .5866123     .635427
 NSTS4 vs STB8      .2861541    .012453    22.98   0.000     .2617467    .3105614
NSTS4 vs NSTB4      .2765697    .012453    22.21   0.000     .2521623    .3009771
 NSTS8 vs STB8       .251342    .012453    20.18   0.000     .2269347    .2757494
NSTS8 vs NSTB4      .2417577    .012453    19.41   0.000     .2173503     .266165
 NSTS4 vs STB4      .2146425    .012453    17.24   0.000     .1902351    .2390499
  STS8 vs STB8      .1975374    .012453    15.86   0.000     .1731301    .2219448
 NSTS8 vs STB4      .1798305    .012453    14.44   0.000     .1554231    .2042378
  STS4 vs STB4      .1756796    .012453    14.11   0.000     .1512723     .200087
  STS8 vs STB4      .1260259    .012453    10.12   0.000     .1016185    .1504332
   NSTS4 vs NT      .1173012    .012453     9.42   0.000     .0928939    .1417086
 NSTS4 vs STS8      .0886166    .012453     7.12   0.000     .0642093     .113024
   NSTS8 vs NT      .0824892    .012453     6.62   0.000     .0580818    .1068965
    STS4 vs NT      .0783383    .012453     6.29   0.000      .053931    .1027457
 NSTS8 vs STS8      .0538046    .012453     4.32   0.000     .0293973     .078212
 NSTS4 vs STS4      .0389629    .012453     3.13   0.002     .0145555    .0633702
    STS8 vs NT      .0286846    .012453     2.30   0.021     .0042772    .0530919
 NSTB4 vs STB8      .0095844    .012453     0.77   0.442     -.014823    .0339917
 NSTS8 vs STS4      .0041509    .012453     0.33   0.739    -.0202565    .0285582
NSTS8 vs NSTS4      -.034812    .012453    -2.80   0.005    -.0592194   -.0104047
  STS8 vs STS4     -.0496538    .012453    -3.99   0.000    -.0740611   -.0252464
 NSTB4 vs STB4     -.0619272    .012453    -4.97   0.000    -.0863346   -.0375198
  STB8 vs STB4     -.0715116    .012453    -5.74   0.000    -.0959189   -.0471042
    STB4 vs NT     -.0973413    .012453    -7.82   0.000    -.1217487   -.0729339
   NSTB4 vs NT     -.1592685    .012453   -12.79   0.000    -.1836758   -.1348611
    STB8 vs NT     -.1688529    .012453   -13.56   0.000    -.1932602   -.1444455
 NSTB4 vs STS8     -.1879531    .012453   -15.09   0.000    -.2123604   -.1635457
 NSTB4 vs STS4     -.2376068    .012453   -19.08   0.000    -.2620142   -.2131995
  STB8 vs STS4     -.2471912    .012453   -19.85   0.000    -.2715985   -.2227838
 NSTB8 vs STB8     -.3596776    .012453   -28.88   0.000     -.384085   -.3352703
NSTB8 vs NSTB4      -.369262    .012453   -29.65   0.000    -.3936693   -.3448546
 NSTB8 vs STB4     -.4311892    .012453   -34.63   0.000    -.4555965   -.4067818
   NSTB8 vs NT     -.5285305    .012453   -42.44   0.000    -.5529378   -.5041231
 NSTB8 vs STS8      -.557215    .012453   -44.75   0.000    -.5816224   -.5328077
 NSTB8 vs STS4     -.6068688    .012453   -48.73   0.000    -.6312761   -.5824614
NSTB8 vs NSTS4     -.6458317    .012453   -51.86   0.000     -.670239   -.6214243
        TaxType  
                                                                                 
                    Contrast   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                             Unadjusted           Unadjusted
                                                                                 
                                                                                 
 NSTB8 vs STS8      .5021225   .0088219    56.92   0.000     .4848318    .5194132
NSTB8 vs NSTS4      .4842352   .0088219    54.89   0.000     .4669446    .5015259
 NSTB4 vs STS8      .3907504   .0088219    44.29   0.000     .3734597     .408041
 NSTB8 vs STS4      .3685486   .0088219    41.78   0.000     .3512579    .3858393
  STB8 vs STS4      .2718554   .0088219    30.82   0.000     .2545648    .2891461
 NSTB4 vs STS4      .2571765   .0088219    29.15   0.000     .2398858    .2744672
   NSTB8 vs NT      .1740737   .0088219    19.73   0.000      .156783    .1913644
 NSTB8 vs STB4      .1255001   .0088219    14.23   0.000     .1082094    .1427908
NSTB8 vs NSTB4      .1113721   .0088219    12.62   0.000     .0940815    .1286628
 NSTB8 vs STB8      .0966932   .0088219    10.96   0.000     .0794025    .1139839
    STB8 vs NT      .0773805   .0088219     8.77   0.000     .0600898    .0946712
   NSTB4 vs NT      .0627015   .0088219     7.11   0.000     .0454109    .0799922
    STB4 vs NT      .0485736   .0088219     5.51   0.000     .0312829    .0658643
  STB8 vs STB4      .0288069   .0088219     3.27   0.001     .0115162    .0460976
 NSTS4 vs STS8      .0178873   .0088219     2.03   0.043     .0005966    .0351779
 NSTS8 vs STS8      .0160506   .0088219     1.82   0.069    -.0012401    .0333413
 NSTB4 vs STB4       .014128   .0088219     1.60   0.109    -.0031627    .0314187
NSTS8 vs NSTS4     -.0018367   .0088219    -0.21   0.835    -.0191273     .015454
 NSTB4 vs STB8      -.014679   .0088219    -1.66   0.096    -.0319696    .0026117
 NSTS4 vs STS4     -.1156866   .0088219   -13.11   0.000    -.1329773   -.0983959
 NSTS8 vs STS4     -.1175233   .0088219   -13.32   0.000     -.134814   -.1002326
  STS8 vs STS4     -.1335739   .0088219   -15.14   0.000    -.1508646   -.1162832
    STS4 vs NT     -.1944749   .0088219   -22.04   0.000    -.2117656   -.1771843
  STS4 vs STB4     -.2430485   .0088219   -27.55   0.000    -.2603392   -.2257578
   NSTS4 vs NT     -.3101616   .0088219   -35.16   0.000    -.3274522   -.2928709
   NSTS8 vs NT     -.3119982   .0088219   -35.37   0.000    -.3292889   -.2947075
    STS8 vs NT     -.3280488   .0088219   -37.19   0.000    -.3453395   -.3107581
 NSTS4 vs STB4     -.3587351   .0088219   -40.66   0.000    -.3760258   -.3414445
 NSTS8 vs STB4     -.3605718   .0088219   -40.87   0.000    -.3778625   -.3432811
NSTS4 vs NSTB4     -.3728631   .0088219   -42.27   0.000    -.3901538   -.3555724
NSTS8 vs NSTB4     -.3746998   .0088219   -42.47   0.000    -.3919905   -.3574091
  STS8 vs STB4     -.3766224   .0088219   -42.69   0.000    -.3939131   -.3593317
 NSTS4 vs STB8     -.3875421   .0088219   -43.93   0.000    -.4048327   -.3702514
 NSTS8 vs STB8     -.3893787   .0088219   -44.14   0.000    -.4066694   -.3720881
  STS8 vs STB8     -.4054293   .0088219   -45.96   0.000      -.42272   -.3881386
NSTS8 vs NSTB8     -.4860719   .0088219   -55.10   0.000    -.5033626   -.4687812
        TaxType  
                                                                                 
                    Contrast   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                             Unadjusted           Unadjusted
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Table 3B: Contrasts on Market Allocational Efficiency 
 
 
Table 4B: Contrasts on Smith’s Alpha 
 
                                                                                 
 NSTB4 vs STS8      .0810812   .0048638    16.67   0.000     .0715484    .0906141
 NSTS4 vs STS8      .0433063   .0048638     8.90   0.000     .0337735    .0528392
 NSTS8 vs STS8      .0209305   .0048638     4.30   0.000     .0113977    .0304634
 NSTB4 vs STS4      .0178461   .0048638     3.67   0.000     .0083133     .027379
 NSTB8 vs STS8      .0160839   .0048638     3.31   0.001     .0065511    .0256168
 NSTB4 vs STB8      .0110775   .0048638     2.28   0.023     .0015447    .0206104
  STB8 vs STS4      .0067686   .0048638     1.39   0.164    -.0027642    .0163015
NSTS8 vs NSTB8      .0048466   .0048638     1.00   0.319    -.0046863    .0143794
 NSTB4 vs STB4     -.0002753   .0048638    -0.06   0.955    -.0098081    .0092575
  STB8 vs STB4     -.0113528   .0048638    -2.33   0.020    -.0208857     -.00182
  STS4 vs STB4     -.0181214   .0048638    -3.73   0.000    -.0276543   -.0085886
 NSTS4 vs STS4     -.0199288   .0048638    -4.10   0.000    -.0294616   -.0103959
NSTS8 vs NSTS4     -.0223758   .0048638    -4.60   0.000    -.0319087    -.012843
    STB4 vs NT     -.0235583   .0048638    -4.84   0.000    -.0330912   -.0140255
   NSTB4 vs NT     -.0238336   .0048638    -4.90   0.000    -.0333665   -.0143008
 NSTS4 vs STB8     -.0266974   .0048638    -5.49   0.000    -.0362302   -.0171646
NSTB8 vs NSTS4     -.0272224   .0048638    -5.60   0.000    -.0367553   -.0176896
    STB8 vs NT     -.0349111   .0048638    -7.18   0.000     -.044444   -.0253783
NSTS4 vs NSTB4     -.0377749   .0048638    -7.77   0.000    -.0473077   -.0282421
 NSTS4 vs STB4     -.0380502   .0048638    -7.82   0.000    -.0475831   -.0285174
    STS4 vs NT     -.0416798   .0048638    -8.57   0.000    -.0512126   -.0321469
 NSTS8 vs STS4     -.0423046   .0048638    -8.70   0.000    -.0518374   -.0327718
 NSTB8 vs STS4     -.0471512   .0048638    -9.69   0.000     -.056684   -.0376183
 NSTS8 vs STB8     -.0490732   .0048638   -10.09   0.000    -.0586061   -.0395404
 NSTB8 vs STB8     -.0539198   .0048638   -11.09   0.000    -.0634526    -.044387
NSTS8 vs NSTB4     -.0601507   .0048638   -12.37   0.000    -.0696836   -.0506179
 NSTS8 vs STB4      -.060426   .0048638   -12.42   0.000    -.0699589   -.0508932
   NSTS4 vs NT     -.0616085   .0048638   -12.67   0.000    -.0711414   -.0520757
  STS8 vs STS4     -.0632351   .0048638   -13.00   0.000     -.072768   -.0537023
NSTB8 vs NSTB4     -.0649973   .0048638   -13.36   0.000    -.0745302   -.0554645
 NSTB8 vs STB4     -.0652726   .0048638   -13.42   0.000    -.0748055   -.0557398
  STS8 vs STB8     -.0700037   .0048638   -14.39   0.000    -.0795366   -.0604709
  STS8 vs STB4     -.0813566   .0048638   -16.73   0.000    -.0908894   -.0718237
   NSTS8 vs NT     -.0839843   .0048638   -17.27   0.000    -.0935172   -.0744515
   NSTB8 vs NT     -.0888309   .0048638   -18.26   0.000    -.0983638   -.0792981
    STS8 vs NT     -.1049149   .0048638   -21.57   0.000    -.1144477    -.095382
        TaxType  
                                                                                 
                    Contrast   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                             Unadjusted           Unadjusted
                                                                                 
                                                                                 
   NSTS8 vs NT      5.340756   .1608729    33.20   0.000     5.025451    5.656061
 NSTS8 vs STB4       5.03854   .1608729    31.32   0.000     4.723235    5.353845
   NSTB8 vs NT      4.008923   .1608729    24.92   0.000     3.693618    4.324229
    STS8 vs NT      3.786863   .1608729    23.54   0.000     3.471558    4.102168
 NSTB8 vs STB4      3.706708   .1608729    23.04   0.000     3.391403    4.022013
 NSTS8 vs STS4      3.682422   .1608729    22.89   0.000     3.367117    3.997727
 NSTS8 vs STB8      3.646563   .1608729    22.67   0.000     3.331258    3.961868
  STS8 vs STB4      3.484648   .1608729    21.66   0.000     3.169343    3.799953
NSTS8 vs NSTS4      2.829358   .1608729    17.59   0.000     2.514053    3.144663
NSTS8 vs NSTB4      2.791366   .1608729    17.35   0.000     2.476061    3.106672
   NSTB4 vs NT      2.549389   .1608729    15.85   0.000     2.234084    2.864694
   NSTS4 vs NT      2.511398   .1608729    15.61   0.000     2.196092    2.826703
 NSTB8 vs STS4       2.35059   .1608729    14.61   0.000     2.035285    2.665895
 NSTB8 vs STB8      2.314731   .1608729    14.39   0.000     1.999426    2.630036
 NSTB4 vs STB4      2.247174   .1608729    13.97   0.000     1.931869    2.562479
 NSTS4 vs STB4      2.209182   .1608729    13.73   0.000     1.893877    2.524487
  STS8 vs STS4       2.12853   .1608729    13.23   0.000     1.813225    2.443835
  STS8 vs STB8      2.092671   .1608729    13.01   0.000     1.777366    2.407976
    STB8 vs NT      1.694193   .1608729    10.53   0.000     1.378887    2.009498
    STS4 vs NT      1.658333   .1608729    10.31   0.000     1.343028    1.973638
 NSTS8 vs STS8      1.553892   .1608729     9.66   0.000     1.238587    1.869197
NSTB8 vs NSTS4      1.497526   .1608729     9.31   0.000     1.182221    1.812831
NSTB8 vs NSTB4      1.459534   .1608729     9.07   0.000     1.144229    1.774839
  STB8 vs STB4      1.391977   .1608729     8.65   0.000     1.076672    1.707282
  STS4 vs STB4      1.356118   .1608729     8.43   0.000     1.040813    1.671423
NSTS8 vs NSTB8      1.331832   .1608729     8.28   0.000     1.016527    1.647137
 NSTB4 vs STS4      .8910559   .1608729     5.54   0.000     .5757508    1.206361
 NSTB4 vs STB8      .8551967   .1608729     5.32   0.000     .5398916    1.170502
 NSTS4 vs STS4      .8530642   .1608729     5.30   0.000     .5377591    1.168369
 NSTS4 vs STB8       .817205   .1608729     5.08   0.000     .5018999     1.13251
    STB4 vs NT      .3022153   .1608729     1.88   0.060    -.0130898    .6175204
 NSTB8 vs STS8        .22206   .1608729     1.38   0.167    -.0932451    .5373652
  STB8 vs STS4      .0358592   .1608729     0.22   0.824    -.2794459    .3511643
NSTS4 vs NSTB4     -.0379917   .1608729    -0.24   0.813    -.3532968    .2773134
 NSTB4 vs STS8     -1.237474   .1608729    -7.69   0.000    -1.552779    -.922169
 NSTS4 vs STS8     -1.275466   .1608729    -7.93   0.000    -1.590771   -.9601607
        TaxType  
                                                                                 
                    Contrast   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                             Unadjusted           Unadjusted
                                                                                 
